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Abstract
Information flow properties are a way of specifying security properties of sys-
tems, dating back to the work of Goguen and Meseguer in the eighties. In this
framework, a system is modelled as having high-level (or confidential) events
as well as low-level (or public) events, and a typical property requires that the
high-level events should not “influence” the occurrence of low-level events. In
other words, the sequence of low-level events observed from a system execu-
tion should not reveal “too much” information about the high-level events that
may have taken place. For example, the trace-based “non-inference” property
states that for every trace produced by the system, its projection to low-level
events must also be a possible trace of the system. For a system satisfying
non-inference, a low-level adversary (who knows the language generated by the
system) viewing only the low-level events in any execution cannot infer any in-
formation about the occurrence of high-level events in that execution. Other
well-known properties include separability, generalized non-interference, non-
deducibility of outputs etc. These properties are trace-based. Similarly there
is another class of properties based on the structure of the transition system
called bisimulation-based information flow properties, defined by Focardi and
Gorrieri in 1995.
In our thesis we study the problem of model-checking the well-known trace-
based and bisimulation-based properties for some popular classes of infinite-
state system models. We first consider trace-based properties. We define some
language-theoretic operations that help to characterize language-inclusion in
terms of satisfaction of these properties. This gives us a reduction of the lan-
guage inclusion problem for a class of system models, say F , to the model-
checking problem for F whenever F is effectively closed under these language-
theoretic operations. We apply this result to show that the model-checking
problem for Petri nets, pushdown systems and for some properties on deter-
ministic pushdown sytems is undecidable. We also consider the class of visibly
pushdown systems and show that their model-checking problem is undecidable
in general (for some properties). Then we show that for the restricted class of
visibly pushdown systems in which all the high (confidential) events are inter-
nal, the model-checking problem becomes decidable. Similarly we show that
the problem of model-checking bisimulation-based properties is undecidable for
Petri nets, pushdown systems and process algebras.
Next we consider the problem of detecting information leakage in programs.
Here the programs are modeled to have low and high inputs and low outputs.
The well known definition of “non-interference” on programs says that in no
execution should the low outputs depend on the high inputs. However this
definition was shown to be too strong to be used in practice, with a simple (and
considered to be safe) “password-checking” program failing it. “Abstract non-
interference (ANI)” and its variants were proposed in the literature to generalize
or weaken non-interference. We call these definitions qualitative refinements of
non-interference. We study the problem of model-checking many classes of
finite-data programs (variables taking values from a bounded domain) for these
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refinements. We give algorithms and show that this problem is in PSPACE for
while, EXPTIME for recursive and EXPSPACE for asynchronous finite-data
programs.
We finally study different quantitative refinements of non-interference pro-
posed in the literature. We first characterize these measures in terms of preim-
ages. These characterizations potentially help designing analysis computing
over and under approximations for these measures. Then we investigate the
applicability of these measures on standard cryptographic functions.
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